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I. The Context
In recent years the problems associated with the illicit use and misuse of
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances have assumed greater political and
social prominence in the United Kingdom than ever before. This results, in part,
from the fact that the scale of the problem has increased significantly throughout
the 1980s. All of the admittedly imperfect statistical indicators, including the
volume of drugs seized, the number of persons convictdd or cautioned for drug
offenses, and the number of drug "addicts" notified to the government by
medical practitioners, tell the same disturbing story.' In addition:
There is evidence that drug misuse has become more pervasive. In the 1960s it
tended to be associated with an alternative youth sub-culture, mainly centered in
London, or-in the case of cocaine-with people in the higher socio-economic
brackets. But drug misuse is now encountered in all social classes and in all parts of
the country.
2
Not only has illicit drug use in the United Kingdom expanded in scope, it has
also started to change in nature. In 1985 the House of Commons Home Affairs
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I. See, e.g., HOME OFFICE, TACKLING DRUG MISUSE: A SUMMARY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S
STRATEGY 5-6 (H.M.S.O., London: 3d ed., 1988). In May 1989, the Home Secretary, Mr. Douglas
Hurd, stated: "In the United Kingdom, all the main indicators have risen substantially over the last
few years and continue to do so." Opening by Home Secretary: Speaking Notes, Pompidou Group
Ministerial Meeting I (May 18-19, 1989) (unpublished typescript provided by the Home Office)
[hereinafter May 1989 Remarks].
2. TACKLING DRUG MISUSE, supra note 1, at 6.
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Committee, troubled by the pattern of cocaine abuse in the United States,
expressed the fear that "unless immediate and effective action is taken Britain
and Europe stand to inherit the American drug problem in less than five years.
We see this as the most serious peace time threat to our national well-being. ' 3 In
spite of this warning, and subsequent governmental action, the Home Office in
early 1989 confirmed that "the perceived threat from cocaine has materialized."
4
As the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs was to inform Parliament on January 11, 1989:
There is, unfortunately, a considerable amount of evidence that the drug cartels have
targeted the whole of Europe for an increase in the export of cocaine, especially from
Latin America. Also, because of the difference between the wholesale price of cocaine
in London and in the United States there is an increasing trend towards exporting
refined cocaine directly from the United States to the United Kingdom and elsewhere
in Europe. 5
A further factor, worthy of note at this stage, is that "[d]rug-related mortality
is in the process of being disastrously inflated by the advent of the Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). ' 6 Research has demonstrated that this
results from the practice followed by intravenous drug users in certain parts of
the country, and particularly in Scotland, of sharing infected equipment. 7 As
recently noted: "Most of the infected drug users are young, sexually active and
heterosexual. Some are working prostitutes. The possible implications of this
development for public health are extremely grave and threaten to dwarf those of
illegal drug use itself.
' 8
In the face of this ever growing threat, the British government has evolved a
comprehensive strategy 9 that affords full recognition to the global nature of the
3. House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Misuse of Hard Drugs (Interim Report),
H.C. Paper No. 399, para. 2 (1984-85) [hereinafter Misuse of Hard Drugs].
4. Home Affairs Committee Inquiry into Drug Trafficking and Related Serious Crime:
Memorandum Submitted by the Home Office, H.C. Paper No. 370-i, at 6, para. 40 (1988-89)
[hereinafter Inquiry].
5. 144 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) No. 24, col. 823-24 (Jan. 1I, 1989) (Oral Answers). On
the street price of selected illicit drugs in the United Kingdom see 149 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
No. 73, col. 538 (Mar. 21, 1989) (Written Answers). On the concern felt over the appearance in the
United Kingdom of the cocaine derivative known as "crack," see the remarks of the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, 154 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) No. 118,
col. 520 (June 9, 1989), and House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Crack: The Threat of
Hard Drugs in the Next Decade (Interim Report), H.C. Paper No. 536 (1988-89).
6. Plant, The Epidemiology of Illicit Drug Use and Misuse in Britain, in DRUGS IN BRITISH
SOCIETY 61 (S. MacGregor ed. 1989).
7. See Brettle, Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Drug Misuse: the Edinburgh Experience,
295 BRIT. MED. J. 421 (1987); see also Robertson, Epidemic of AIDS Related Virus (HTLV-IIILAV)
Infection Among Intravenous Drug Abusers, 292 BRIT. MED. J. 527 (1986).
8. Plant, supra note 6, at 62; see also May 1989 Remarks, supra note 1, at 2.
9. See generally TACKLING DRUG MISUSE, supra note 1. The main strands are reducing
supplies from abroad, increasing the effectiveness of enforcement, maintaining effective deterrents
and tight domestic controls, developing prevention and education, and improving treatment and
rehabilitation.
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problem'° and the consequent need for international cooperation. " As the Home
Office, which has the lead departmental responsibility for combating drug
misuse, 12 recently stated in a report to a Parliamentary Committee: "A very high
proportion of the drugs misused in this country are illegally imported. Support
for international action to curb illicit drug production and trafficking is therefore
a key element in the government's strategy against drug trafficking and abuse." 13
The global dimension to British policy has been evident for some years, for
example, through its commitment to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
as amended by the 1972 Protocol. 14 This Convention "provides for international
controls over the production and availability of opium and its derivatives,
synthetic drugs having similar effects, cocaine and cannabis."' 5 As a conse-
quence of a number of reservations concerning the efficacy of the 1971 United
Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 16 which extends the concept of
international control to a wide range of synthetic drugs, 17 the United Kingdom
initially refrained from ratifying it. In the mid-1980s, however, the position was
reexamined and the conclusion was reached that "these reservations are
outweighed by the value of the Convention in combating drug misuse, and in
promoting international cooperation."' 8 The United Kingdom took the necessary
steps to secure full participation in 1986.19 The British government has also
given its full support to new multilateral initiatives. It was an active participant
in the June 1987 International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit
Trafficking, 20 and was one of the first signatories of the December 19, 1988,
10. There is ever growing literature on the global nature and extent of the problem of illicit drug
use. See, e.g., B. WHITAKER, THE GLOBAL Fix: THE CRISIS OF DRUG ADDICTION (1988); see also
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 1988, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/1988/1,
U.N. Sales No. E.88.XI.6 (1988).
II. See, e.g., TACKLING DRUG MISUSE, supra note 1, at 9-12.
12. For a breakdown on British departmental responsibilities in this area, see id. at 36.
13. Inquiry, supra note 4, at 2, para. 7.
14. Aug. 8, 1975, 976 U.N.T.S. 106 [hereinafter Convention on Narcotic Drugs]. The United
Kingdom ratified the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs on Sept. 2, 1964, and ratified the
amending Protocol of 1972 on June 20, 1978. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1987, at 243, 258, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. E/6,
U.N. Sales No. E.88.V.3 (1988) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES].
15. See Home Office Memorandum of December 1984, reproduced in House of Commons, Home
Affairs Committee, Misuse of Hard Drugs, H.C. Paper No. 66, Minutes of Evidence (Mar. 27, 1985)
(1985-86).
16. See Aug. 16, 1976, 1019 U.N.T.S. 176 [hereinafter Convention on Psychotropic Sub-
stances].
17. See, e.g., S. K. CHATrERJEE, A GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL DRUGS CONVENTIONS 17-19
(Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1988). For a brief overview of the international approach to
narcotics matters, see Noll, Drug Control International, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 106 (1986).
18. Misuse of Hard Drugs, supra note 15, para. 21.
19. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 14, at 251.
20. See 26 I.L.M. 1637 (1988); see also U.N. Narcotics Conference Meets in Vienna, DEP'T ST.
BULL. 77 (Sept. 1987).
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United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances. 2 1 Similarly, the British government has actively
encouraged European regional cooperation through its participation in the
Council of Europe's "Pompidou Group."
22
Significant though the above initiatives have been, bilateral cooperation
continues to play the central role in British policy. It is in this sphere that the most
dramatic strides in international cooperation have been secured and on which the
principal burden is likely to fall in the future. It is, thus, to some of the more
important developments relevant to bilateral cooperation that this study now
turns.
II. Extradition
Extradition has been and seems likely to continue to be the major mechanism
through which the United Kingdom cooperates with other States in criminal
matters, including drug trafficking.2 3 In addition, the procedure of extradition
lies at the heart of the enforcement system provided in both the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended, 24 and the Convention on Psycho-
tropic Substances 25 and continues to occupy an important place in the more
ambitious structure provided in the 1988 United Nations Convention.
26
In the United Kingdom the subject of extradition has been governed by a
number of statutes of which the most important, and the most antiquated, has
21. For the text, see DEP'T ST. BULL. 49 (Apr. 1989) [hereinafter 1988 U.N. Convention]. For
the formal announcement of British signature see 148 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) No. 63, col. 549
(Mar. 8, 1989) (Written Answers). As of the time of writing the United Kingdom has introduced into
Parliament legislation which, when enacted, will permit ratification of this important Convention.
See Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Bill, H.L. Bill I1, 1988-89. This government
measure received its Second Reading in the House of Lords on December 12, 1989. At that time Earl
Ferrers, Minister of State, Home Office, noted that whilst some seventy-five states had signed the
Convention, as of that date only three (the Bahamas, Nigeria, and China) had ratified it. See PARL.
DEB., H.L., Vol. 513, No. 13, 12 December 1989, at col. 1217. He did not mention the important
fact that the U.S. Senate has given its advice and consent to the ratification of this measure. See S.
EXEC. REP. No. 15, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
22. See, e.g., Inquiry, supra note 4, at 3 paras. 13-14. For a more detailed account of the history
and nature of this body, see e.g., 20 March 1985 Supplementary Memorandum Submitted by the
Home Office, reproduced in Misuse of Hard Drugs, supra note 15. The problem of the international
trade in narcotic drugs now regularly appears on the agenda of multilateral fora in which the United
Kingdom participates. See, e.g., The Economic Declaration of 16 July 1989, DEP'T ST. BULL. 13,
16-17 (Sept. 1989) (issued by the seven major industrialized nations and the President of the
Commission of the European Communities).
23. See, e.g., H.C. Paper No. 399, supra note 3, para. 6.
24. See, Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 14, art. 36. On the nature and importance
of extradition in this context, see generally DIVISION OF NARCOTIC DRUGS, UNITED NATIONS,
EXTRADITION FOR DRUG-RELATED OFFENSES, U.N. Doc. St/NAR/5, U.N. Sales No. E.85.XI.6
(1985). See also Fisher, Trends in Extraterritorial Narcotics Control: Slamming the Stable Door
After the Horse has Bolted, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 353, 382-83 (1984).
25. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, supra note 16, art. 22.
26. 1988 U.N. Convention, supra note 21, art. 6.
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been the Extradition Act, 1870.27 For a number of years there has been concern
in governmental circles that the law concerning extradition to foreign states was
both outdated and overly stringent and that the legislative scheme was incapable
of dealing with "a substantial expansion in international crime, such as drug
trafficking." 
28
For these and other reasons the issue was remitted to an Interdepartmental
Working Party which reported in 1982.29 The radical reforms envisaged by that
study were, in turn, subject to further examination and consultation in the
context of a 1985 Green Paper. 30 Finally the British government signified its
agreement to seek wholesale change through legislation in the Criminal Justice
White Paper of 1986. 31
Following a lengthy Parliamentary passage, due in part to the intervening
British general election of 1987, the Criminal Justice Act received the Royal
Assent on July 29, 1988. As expected, this Act 32 paved the way for the
introduction of profound changes in the law of extradition. Subsequent to the
enactment of this statute, and prior to the entry into force of the relevant
provisions, however, the decision was taken to consolidate the many Acts
dealing with extradition to foreign States and to Commonwealth jurisdictions,
the latter being governed by the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967. 33 Following the
Report on the Consolidation of Legislation Relating to Extradition, prepared by
the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 34 Parliament swiftly
passed the Extradition Act 1989,35 which entered into force on September 27 of
the same year.
36
From what has been said above it will come as no surprise that the resulting
reforms in United Kingdom law have been far from straightforward. In particular,
the system provided by the Extradition Act, 1870, as amended, has not been
entirely abandoned and will continue to govern proceedings with foreign states
with which the United Kingdom enjoys extradition treaties until such time as new
27. 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 57 [hereinafter Extradition Act of 18701. For a brief overview of U.K.
extradition law, see E.C.S. WADE AND A.W. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
462-70 (10th ed. 1985).
28. EXTRADITION, CMND. No. 9421 (1985) at 1.
29. See generally A REVIEW OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF EXTRADITION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM:
REPORT OF AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKING PARTY (Home Office, London 1982) [hereinafter
EXTRADITION IN THE U.K.].
30. See EXTRADITION, supra note 28.
31. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLANS FOR LEGISLATION, CMND. No. 2658 (1986), paras. 47-52
[hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANS].
32. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33 (U.K.) [hereinafter CJA]. See generally Warbrick,
Current Developments: International Law III. Extradition, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 418, 424 (1989).
33. 1967 ch. 68 (U.K.) as amended by CJA, supra note 32, sch. 1, pt. III.
34. CM. No. 712 (1989). A Supplementary Report, dealing with issues arising in the context of
certain multilateral treaties, is reproduced in H.L. Paper 68-II, at vii (1988-89).
35. 1989 ch. 33 (U.K.) [hereinafter EA].
36. Id. § 38(2).
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agreements are concluded with them. 37 In addition, the 1989 Act does not address
the subject of the return of offenders as between the United Kingdom and the
Republic of Ireland, which remains governed by the simplified procedure provided
for in the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act, 1965.38
The 1989 British legislation brings into effect a number of major changes that
will impact on the ability of the United Kingdom to extradite persons sought by
other States for drug related offenses. The first such important innovation relates
to ad hoc extradition. International law accepts the premise that a State has no
duty to extradite in the absence of a treaty. 3 9 Equally clear, however, is that no
customary international law rule precludes extradition where no treaty exists
between the requesting and requested State. Indeed, many civil law countries
provide such a facility.4 0 By way of contrast, British law has traditionally
contained no legal authority to extradite to a foreign State in the absence of
such a treaty. 4 ' The United Kingdom currently enjoys formal bilateral
extradition relationships with just over forty foreign States, including the
United States.42 In recent years the British government has continued to
actively pursue negotiations and, in 1986, concluded a new general extradition
treaty with Spain4 3 as well as a Supplementary Treaty with the United States.4
This leaves, however, in excess of sixty States with which Britain has no
general
37. Id. § 1(3) & sch. 1. As Mr. James Rennie, Parliamentary Counsel, stated in evidence before
the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills:
The 1870 Act is still in force. I should explain to the Committee that it will continue
to be in force because it will govern extradition between the United Kingdom and
countries with which we have existing treaties until those treaties are denounced or
replaced. There is no possibility now of a new 1870 treaty. That is prohibited by the
1988 Act. Any new extradition arrangements therefore will be made under the 1988
procedure . . . The situation is therefore that there are three statutes, 1870, 1967 and
1988. We are consolidating all of them. As the 1870 Act will gradually become less
important, it is set out in a Schedule, Schedule 1 to the Bill.
H.L. Paper 68-1I, at 8 (1988-89).
38. 1965 ch. 45 (U.K.), as amended by CJA, supra note 32, sch. 1, pt. II. For the reasons behind
and the nature of this bilateral arrangement, see EXTRADITION, supra note 28, at 20.
39. See, e.g., D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 408 (2d ed. 1976); see also Factor v.
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
40. See Stein, Extradition, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 222, 223 (1985).
41. See EXTRADITION, supra note 28, at 14-15. But see V.E. HARTLEY BOOTH, I BRITISH
EXTRADITION LAW AND PROCEDURE 12-13, 300 (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1980).
42. See EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, 8 JUNE 1972, CMND. No. 6723 (1977). For
a listing of other bilateral treaties, see, e.g., EXTRADITION IN THE U.K., supra note 29, at 117-18.
43. See CMND. No. 9869 (1986).
44. See CMND. No. 9915 (1986); see also Kulman, Eliminating the Political Offense Exception
for Violent Crimes: The Proposed United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty,
26 VA. J. INT'L L. 755 (1986); Lowe & Warbrick, Current Legal Developments: H. Extradition: The
Supplementary Extradition Treaty Between the United Kingdom and the United States, 36 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 404 (1987); Lubet, Extradition Unbound: A Reply to Professors Blakesley and
Bassiouni, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 47 (1989).
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extradition arrangements.45 In the course of its review, the British government
concluded that provision should be made to permit extradition even in the
absence of a treaty. This facility is commonly described as ad hoc extradition.
As the Earl of Caithness stated in the House of Lords on October 20, 1987: "It
remains our policy to maintain treaties as the normal basis for extradition but
we believe that ad hoc extradition might be a useful supplement to our present
arrangements."
46
The principal argument in favor of ad hoc extradition is administrative
convenience. Furthermore, the British government believes that while treaties
help to ensure reciprocity, the United Kingdom should not regard reciprocity in
the extradition field as necessary in all circumstances. Finally, arrangements with
the Commonwealth are based not on treaties, but on substantially uniform
legislation among its members. 4
The Extradition Act, 1989 thus empowers the relevant British Secretary of
State to make special extradition arrangements for particular cases with States
with which the United Kingdom has no general extradition arrangements.48 In
such cases the statutory safeguards for the fugitive apply in the same manner as
they would to extradition pursuant to a "general extradition arrangement" or
treaty.49 Following the recommendations of the Working Party, the Act has no
specified requirement of reciprocity.
A second major departure from tradition concerns the prima facie case
requirement. Under the 1870 Act the requesting State was obliged to provide
British courts with adequate evidence of the conviction or guilt of the individual
in question before extradition could take place. Insofar as the former is
concerned, the only major problem that has arisen concerns cases in which the
individual was convicted in absentia. In this context the British government
45. This is noninclusive of Commonwealth countries where the subject is governed by the 1966
Scheme Relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders within the Commonwealth, as amended. For
the consolidated text, see COMMONWEALTH SCHEMES ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE I (Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1989) [hereinafter 1966 SCHEME]. As the Legal
Division of that body has explained "a 'Scheme' is not a formal multilateral Treaty or Convention,
but rather a set of agreed recommendations endorsed by a Law Ministers' Meeting and collectively
recommended as a guide to Commonwealth Governments for adoption to regulate their relations with
other member countries." Id. at i. In addition, the United Kingdom has become a party to a relatively
small number of multilateral treaties, dealing with certain types of serious crime of international
concern, in which provision is commonly made for extradition. See, e.g., EXTRADITION, supra
note 28, at 19; see also EA, supra note 35, §§ 22-25.
46. 489 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) No. 20, col. 58.
47. See EXTRADITION IN THE U.K., supra note 29, at 6-9; see also EXTRADITION, supra note 28,
at 14-15.
48. EA, supra note 35, § 3(3)(b).
49. Id. § 15. No Parliamentary control over this process is provided for. The expectation is,
however, that in such cases the Secretary of State will take such steps as are required to satisfy
himself "that the standards of justice and penal administration in the requesting state were such
that it would be in the interest of justice to surrender the fugitive." EXTRADITION, supra note 28,
at 15.
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concluded that the law afforded inadequate safeguards. Consequently the Act
provides that an individual "shall not" be returned if it appears to either the
Secretary of State or the British courts that: (a) the conviction was obtained in his
absence; and (b) it would not be in the interests of justice to return him on the
ground of that conviction. 5 °
Considerable difficulties did, however, arise in cases in which the individual
had been accused, but not yet convicted, of a criminal offense. In these
circumstances section 10 of the 1870 Act required the foreign State to produce
sufficient evidence under English law "to justify the committal for trial of the
prisoner if the crime of which he is accused had been committed in England
I. This is what is known as the prima facie case requirement. The need to
satisfy this requirement has been the source of considerable dissatisfaction
among foreign States and particularly those in Western Europe. As the 1985
Green Paper noted:
Something like a third of applications made to the United Kingdom . . . fail, often
because of the inability of the requesting state to satisfy the prima facie case
requirement. Furthermore there are occasions on which some states are deterred from
making a request at all because they believe it will be too difficult to meet the
requirement.5"
Eventually, the British government decided that the requesting State should
judge the sufficiency of the evidence for a trial of the fugitive. Thus, in the
Criminal Justice White Paper the intention to abolish the requirement was
announced. 5 2 In arriving at this controversial decision, the British government
was seemingly persuaded by the view that other elements in British extradition
law, such as double criminality, specialty, and the political safeguard, would
ensure "that a fugitive is not surrendered in circumstances where this would be
manifestly unjust or oppressive." 53
When the British government first presented the Criminal Justice Bill to
Parliament, it envisioned a narrower scheme, apparently as a result of further
consideration of British-American relations. This scheme provided for the
progressive abolition of the prima facie requirement, by Order in Council, on a
State-by-State basis. Even in this form, however, the proposal attracted consid-
erable opposition in Parliament. There it was characterized as extradition on
demand and as the elimination of an important and long-established protection
for the individual. In short, it was widely regarded as going too far in changing
the balance of law against the defendant. 5
4
50. EA, supra note 35, § 6(2).
51. EXTRADITION, supra note 28, at 4; see also Warbrick, The Criminal Justice Act 1988: (1) The
New Law on Extradition, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 4, 9-10.
52. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANS, supra note 31, para. 50.
53. EXTRADITION, supra note 28, at 5; see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANS, supra note 31, para. 50.
54. See, e.g., the speech of Lord Irvine of Lairg, 488 PARL. DEB., H.L., (5th Ser.) cols. 950-54
(July 14, 1987). The requirement remains in cases of ad hoc extradition. It also remains in respect
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In the face of this opposition, particularly in the House of Lords, the British
government made a number of concessions. First, it indicated that it would, in
practice, take steps to abolish the requirement only in the context of the
relationships with Western European States and parties to the 1957 European
Convention on Extradition, which the United Kingdom now intends to ratify.
55
Second, the British government accepted an amendment whereby all Orders in
Council that seek to dispense with the prima facie rule "shall be subject to
annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament."
56
Thus, under the 1989 Act, a State requesting the return of an individual
accused of an offense under a general extradition arrangement must satisfy the
court, unless an Order in Council otherwise provides, "that the evidence would
be sufficient to warrant his trial if the extradition crime had taken place within the
jurisdiction of the court." 57 The requirement also remains in all cases of ad hoc
extradition. 58 In addition, the traditional prima facie case requirement continues
to govern proceedings brought under the 1870 Act procedures and in respect of
Commonwealth countries. 59 Finally, a number of improvements now obtain that
should permit the fugitive to make more effective use of his or her right to make
representations to the Secretary of State against return and to seek judicial review
of any order by the Secretary of State authorizing return.
60
Another consequence of the 1989 Act is to expand significantly the range of
offenses that attract extradition. This result has been accomplished primarily
through the abandonment of the system of specifically listing offenses that are
extraditable under U.K. law.6 1 A "no list" or "eliminative" method, which
defines extraditable offenses in terms of severity of punishment, has replaced the
former system. This procedure is favored by many civil law jurisdictions and is
the one used in the European Convention of 1957.62 The 1989 Act defines an
extradition crime as:
of rendition to Commonwealth countries. Commonwealth Law Ministers reaffirmed their support for
the requirement at their meeting in Harare in 1986 though certain other changes to the Scheme were
agreed at that time. See Commonwealth Law Ministers' Meeting Harare 26 July-I August, Com-
munique (LMM (86) 64).
55. See, e.g., 489 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) No. 20, col. 27 (Oct. 20, 1987) (The Earl of
Caithness). For the text of the European Convention on Extradition of December 13, 1957, see 359
U.N.T.S. 274 [hereinafter European Convention].
56. EA, supra note 35, § 4(5); see also 125 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) No. 74, cols. 681-82
(Jan. 18, 1988) (Secretary of State for the Home Department); Warbrick, supra note 51, at 11.
57. EA, supra note 35, § 9(8)(a).
58. Id.
59. See clause 5(4)(a) of the 1966 SCHEME, supra note 45. The issue of modification of this
requirement remains under active discussion in relevant British governmental circles within the
Commonwealth.
60. See EA, supra note 35, § 13.
61. See EXTRADITION, supra note 28, at 9-11. For a listing of such offenses, see EXTRADITION
IN THE U.K., supra note 29, at 106-07. Most drug related offenses are so included by virtue of § I
of the Extradition Act, 1932, ch. 39 (U.K.). See also EA, supra note 35, sch. 1, § 20 and sch. 2.
62. See European Convention, supra note 55, art. 2.
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conduct in the territory of a foreign state, a designated Commonwealth country or a
colony which, if it occurred in the United Kingdom, would constitute an offense
punishable with imprisonment for a term of 12 months, or any greater punishment, and
which, however described in the law of the foreign state, Commonwealth country or
colony is so punishable under that law.
6 3
For these purposes the law of the United Kingdom "includes the law of any part
of the United Kingdom." 64 At the Commonwealth Law Minister's Meeting in
Harare in 1986, the British government sought and obtained agreement to the use
of the eliminative method in the Commonwealth scheme and the Act makes
appropriate provision to this end .65
Under the new system, all common law offenses and a substantial number of
additional statutory offenses will become appropriate vehicles for extradition.66
Perhaps for this reason the British government unexpectedly recognized a need
to include statutory safeguards against surrender on grounds of the triviality of
the offense. Similarly, extradition is precluded if it appears that because of the
passage of time or because the accusation was not made in good faith, "it would,
having regard to all the circumstances, be unjust or oppressive to return him." 67
Also, given that provisions derived from the 1870 Act will continue to govern
many extradition cases, the opportunity was taken to add to the list of extradition
crimes contained in Schedule I thereof. These include offenses under section 24
of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986.68
Since the United Kingdom has long been wedded to the territorial principle of
jurisdiction, it is not surprising that the 1870 Act was formulated on the
assumption of a strong territorial connection between the offense complained of
and the requesting State. In practice, extradition was possible when the offense
took place in the requesting State's land territory, territorial waters, or other
locations "generally treated as part of its territory," such as on ships and aircraft
registered in the requesting State.69
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom has never relied exclusively on the
territorial principle. As the English Law Commission noted in its 1978 Report on
the Territorial and Extraterritorial Extent of the Criminal Law, limited reliance
63. EA, supra note 35, § 2(l)(a); see also id. § 2(4)(b) and (c).
64. Id. § 2(4)(a).
65. See id. § 2(l)(a). This uses the twelve-month punishment threshold despite the fact that the
revised Commonwealth Scheme specifies the more exacting standard of "two years or a greater
penalty." See clause 2(2) of the 1966 SCHEME, supra note 45. There is nothing to prevent a
Commonwealth country from adopting a more concessive policy in its legislation than that required
by the Scheme.
66. See, e.g., EXTRADITION IN THE U.K., supra note 29, at 108-16.
67. See EA, supra note 35, § 11(3) and § 12(2)(a).
68. Such as assisting another to retain the benefit of drug trafficking. See EA, supra note 35,
§ 38(4).
69. For a discussion of this issue, see EXTRADITION IN THE U.K., supra note 29, at 16-18.
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has been placed on other jurisdictional grounds. 70 Given these factors, the British
government has concluded that it is in the interests of justice that the United
Kingdom be able to surrender fugitives in respect of a broad range of
extraterritorial offenses. 7' To this end the Act makes provision for two specific
categories where such surrender would be appropriate: (1) where "in corre-
sponding circumstances equivalent conduct would constitute an extra-territorial
offense against the law of the United Kingdom . . .";72 and (2) other extra-
territorial offenses that satisfy all of the following conditions: (a) the requesting
State bases its jurisdiction on the nationality of the offender; (b) the conduct
occurred outside the United Kingdom; and (c) that, if it occurred in the United
Kingdom, it would constitute an offense under the law of the United Kingdom.
73
This comprehensive recognition of the sufficiency of a nationality nexus for
extradition purposes will again be of particular benefit to civil law countries that
use it extensively.
Finally, a general feature of extradition practice requires that "the requested
state should exercise some control over the prosecution of the surrendered
fugitive for other crimes committed before his surrender ... Under the
Extradition Act, 1870 this takes the form of requiring that the individual may not
"be tried in that foreign state for any offense committed prior to his surrender
other than the extradition crime proved by the facts on which the surrender is
grounded. ' 75 By way of contrast, a much more flexible approach was adopted
both in article 14 of the European Convention on Extradition and section 4(3) of
the Fugitive Offenders Act. The latter, for example, "enables the fugitive to be
dealt with for any lesser offense proved by the facts or for any other relevant
offense to which the Secretary of State consents."' 76 The British government
reached the conclusion that the specialty rule should be relaxed along the lines of
the 1967 Act. The Extradition Act, 1989 makes provision to that end.77
In light of the above, it must be concluded that through these measures the
United Kingdom has ensured that in the future foreign States may secure the
extradition of fugitives more easily. In the words of one commentator:
The British Government intends that there should be more extradition and the new law
is influenced more by the cooperative aspect of extradition than by the protective
70. Law Commission No. 91 (H.M.S.O., London, 1978); see also Ferguson, Jurisdiction and
Criminal Law in Scotland and England, JURID. REv. 179 (1987); Lew, The Extra-territorial Criminal
Jurisdiction of English Courts, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 168 (1978).
71. See, e.g., EXTRADITION, supra note 28, at 21.
72. EA, supra note 35, § 2(2); see also Warbrick, supra note 51, at 8.
73. EA, supra note 35, § 2(3).
74. EXTRADITION, supra note 28, at 13.
75. Extradition Act, 1870, supra note 27, § 3(2).
76. EXTRADITION, supra note 28, at 13.
77. EA, supra note 35, § 6(4)-(7). For similar provisions governing the position of an individual
returned to the United Kingdom, see also id. §§ 18-20.
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understanding of the process. . . . If the British Government is right that this country
is being chosen as a refuge by fugitive criminals because they think they can count on
protection against extradition, the new law will have a deterrent objective, although this
can only work by diverting them to other jurisdictions. 78
III. Bilateral Treaty Practice
In addition to modernizing and reshaping the traditional weapon of extradi-
tion, the enhanced awareness of the need for international cooperation to combat
the illicit trade in narcotic drugs has led the United Kingdom to conclude a
number of innovative bilateral agreements. In this process the needs and
demands of Anglo-American relations have been particularly influential.
A. THE CARIBBEAN CONNECTION
The first novel and drug-related bilateral arrangement worthy of note was
concluded with the United States in November 1981 and addressed the issue of
narcotics interdiction at sea. 79 The need for such an agreement, recently
examined in detail elsewhere, 80 arose out of the frequent use of private foreign
flag vessels to import marijuana and, to a lesser extent, cocaine into the United
States."l Given the location of certain major source and transit countries in South
America, Central America, and in the Caribbean, this problem presented itself in
a particularly acute form in Florida and along the Gulf coast. Among the foreign
vessels involved in this illicit trade were some registered in the United Kingdom
and in Britain's Caribbean dependencies. 82
Although the international law of the sea affords coastal states adequate law
enforcement powers within territorial waters and the contiguous zone, 83 the
78. Warbrick, supra note 51, at 14. The ability of the United Kingdom to take full advantage of
the new law is somewhat circumscribed by the recent decision by the European Court of Human
Rights as to the relevance of the Convention in the context of extradition to a non-Convention state.
See Soering v. United Kingdom, (1/1989/161/217). See also 28 I.L.M. 1063 (1989).
79. EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING
CO-OPERATION IN THE SUPPRESSION OF THE UNLAWFUL IMPORTATION OF NARCOTIC DRUGS INTO THE
UNITED STATES, 13 NOVEMBER 1981, CMND. No. 8470 (1981) [hereinafter EXCHANGE OF NOTES].
80. See Gilmore, Narcotics Interdiction at Sea: UK-US Cooperation, 13 MARINE POL'Y 218
(1989).
81. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE BORDER
WAR ON DRUGS 24, 27 (1987).
82. Five such dependencies remain in the area of greatest concern in this context: Montserrat,
Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands.
83. The United States retained its traditional three-mile territorial sea claim until December 27,
1988 when it was extended to twelve nautical miles by Presidential Proclamation. See 28 I.L.M. 284
(1989). Narcotics law enforcement within this zone is facilitated by art. 19(l)(d) of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. The United States and the United Kingdom
are both parties to this convention. A limited contiguous zone claim is provided for in the United
States Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1711 (1982). Such zones are now
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United States, for practical reasons, wished to extend its maritime interdiction
program to the high seas.84 As U.S. Circuit Judge Kravitch stated in United
States v. Gonzalez:
One need only glance at a map of the [Caribbean] region and compare the vast length
of the United States coast to the narrow straits between Yucatan and Cuba . . . and the
other narrow passages through the West Indies to understand the reasonableness of
enforcing our drug laws outside of our territorial sea. 85
The central international legal difficulty raised by such an interdiction strategy
is reflected in the universally accepted doctrine of exclusive flag State jurisdic-
tion on the high seas.86 Thus, if the strategy was to be effective and comport with
international law, the cooperation of the relevant foreign flag States was
essential.
The initial approach adopted by the Department of State was to request ad hoc
consent from foreign governments, including that of the United Kingdom, 87 to
search and, if warranted, seize vessels suspected of narcotics trafficking.8 8 This
process was clearly unsatisfactory in that it was bound to be time-consuming,
with attendant practical disadvantages for effective law enforcement. 89 The
United States and the United Kingdom addressed these matters in negotiations
between the two governments and eventually agreed to dispense with the need
for formal case-by-case consent. This goal was realized through an Exchange of
Notes on Cooperation in the Suppression of the Unlawful Importation of Narcotic
Drugs into the United States on November 13, 1981.90 This Agreement was
accepted in international law. See, e.g., 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, art. 24.
84. See Anderson, In the Wake of the Dauntless: The Background and Development of Maritime
Interdiction Operations, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: WHAT LIEs AHEAD? II (T.A. Clingan ed. 1988).
85. 776 F.2d 931, 939 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
86. See 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas arts. 6(1), 22; see also Sohn, International
Law of the Sea and Human Rights Issues, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: WHAT LIEs AHEAD? 51, 59 (T.A.
Clingan ed. 1988). Domestic law in the United States was amended in 1980 to facilitate prosecution.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 955a-955d (1982); see also Fisher, supra note 24, at 374-87; Lewis, The
Marijuana on the High Seas Act: Extending U.S. Jurisdiction Beyond International Limits, 8 YALE
J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 359 (1982). United States Law in this respect was further refined in the form
of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, U.S.C. §§ 1901-1903 (Supp. IV 1986).
87. For a description of British involvement, see, e.g., United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 49
(1st Cir. 1982). For an example of a U.S. seizure of a British flag vessel seemingly without prior
consent, see United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979).
88. For a description by the U.S. Department of State of the normal practice, see Boyd,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 375,
379 (1982).
89. See, e.g., Defining Customs Waters for Certain Drug Offenses: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
55 (1985) (testimony of Admiral Cueroni of the U.S. Coast Guard). See also id. at 47 (testimony of
Stuart P. Sidel). In 1986, the United States Congress found that "this process, and obtaining the
consent of the country of registry to further law enforcement action, may delay the interdiction of the
vessel by 3 or 4 days." See annotations to 46 U.S.C. § 1902 (Supp. IV 1986).
90. EXCHANGE OF NOTEs, supra note 79. See generally Siddle, Anglo-American Cooperation in
the Suppression of Drug Smuggling, 31 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 726 (1982).
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essentially nonreciprocal in nature and was designed solely to facilitate the
effective enforcement of U.S. law subject to a number of necessary safeguards
for the United Kingdom.
Paragraph 1 of the Exchange of Notes, which triggers U.S. involvement in any
instance, provides that the British government:
will not object to the boarding by the authorities of the United States ... of private
vessels under the British flag in any case in which those authorities reasonably believe
that the vessel has on board a cargo of drugs for importation into the United States in
violation of the laws of the United States.
The area in which this right to board is afforded is defined in paragraph 9. It
includes all of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, an extensive area of
the Atlantic Ocean "South of latitude 30 North and all other areas within 150
miles of the Atlantic coast of the United States." 9' Subsequent provisions govern
the search and seizure of crew and vessel.92 The Agreement also provides a
number of safeguards 93 including the right of the United Kingdom, within
specified time periods, to object to the continued exercise of U.S. jurisdiction
over the vessel94 and to the prosecution of any U.K. national found on board the
vessel.95 The consequence of such an objection is to require the United States to
release the vessel or person in respect of which the objection has been lodged.
In spite of the obvious ability of the United Kingdom to frustrate the operation
of this Agreement through frequent use of the power to require release of vessels
and prevent prosecution of nationals, this does not appear to have happened.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that the Agreement has been a valuable tool in
actual law enforcement96 and the relevant reported cases do not reveal that the
nature or terms of the Agreement have restricted the ability of U.S. prosecutors
to secure convictions.
97
91. Paragraph I has received judicial consideration in the United States. See, e.g., United States
v. Quemener, 789 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Reeh, 780 F.2d 1541, 1544 (1 lth Cir.
1986). The former case also considers the terms of paragraph 9. 789 F.2d at 148-53. See also
Gilmore, supra note 80, at 222-25. The terms and conditions of the 1981 Agreement have been used
as the basis for ad hoc seizures in other areas. See, e.g., United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp.
1437 (N.D. Cal. 1988), discussed in International Decisions: United States v. Biermann, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 99 (1989).
92. See EXCHANGE OF NOTES, supra note 79, paras. 2, 3.
93. See, e.g., id. paras. 6, 7.
94. See id. para. 4.
95. See id. para. 5; see also Letter from the Head of the Maritime, Aviation and Environment
Dep't, Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the U.S. Embassy, London (Nov. 13, 1981), reproduced
in 1981 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 472.
96. See, e.g., UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIGEST OF INTER-
DICTION STATISTICS (9/30/88) 19-20 (1988). Data also reproduced in Gilmore, supra note 80, at 227.
97. See Gilmore, supra note 80, at 227 n.73. The possibility of further cooperation among States
in the interdiction of drug smugglers at sea is to be expected in the light of article 17 of the 1988 U.N.
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, supra note 21. For
a recent example of Royal Navy assistance to the U.S. Coast Guard in the interdiction of a U.S.
registered vessel off the coast of Mexico, see Royal Navy helps seize drug boat, The Independent
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The second major innovation in British narcotics treaty practice also involved
the United States and arose in the highly charged context of the debate on the
proper limits to American assertions of extraterritoriality. 98 As one contributor to
the debate explained:
[The most pervasive example of judicial extraterritoriality] has been the demands by
U.S. prosecutors for production of documents and other evidence located aboard which
are deemed necessary to Government investigations and court proceedings. Such
demands, most often issued in the form of subpoenas for documents or testimony, have
placed the recipients in the uncomfortable position of having to choose between
complying, and thereby violating their own domestic law, and refusing to comply and
thereby being charged with contempt by the American court. 9 9
Many States consider such unilateral American measures as violations of
international law. 100
British involvement in this context flowed from the spectacular growth
throughout the 1960s and 1970s of its small Caribbean dependency of the
Cayman Islands as an offshore financial center. "In 1964 the Cayman Islands had
two banks and no offshore business. By 1981 the Caymans had 360 branches of
U.S. and foreign banks, over 8,000 registered companies, and more telex
machines per capita . .. than any other country." 10 1 Through its convenient
location, "a short suitcase journey from Miami, ' ' 102 its well-developed bank
secrecy legislation, 10 3 its tax-free status, 10 4 and its political stability, among
other
(London), Sept. 4, 1989. Also of interest in this context was the announcement, on September 27,
1989, that bilateral assistance to the Republic of Colombia would include "Periodic deployments of
Royal Navy vessels to assist the Colombians with maritime surveillance." Policy Statement: British
Foreign Secretary Announces Package of Anti-Drugs Assistance for Colombia, (Sept. 27, 1989)
(unpublished: text provided by Embassy of Colombia, London); see also Navy to Join War on Drugs
in Colombia, The Times (London), Sept. 28, 1989. According to one report, "The idea is that the
frigate could act as a surveillance center for identifying and tracking shipping on the Caribbean drug
route from Colombia to the United States and Canada." Aid Frigate Pays a Quiet Call, The Guardian
(London), Oct. 5, 1989.
98. See generally A.V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION (1983); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 340-66 (1987).
99. Nadelmann, Unlaundering Dirty Money Abroad: U.S. Foreign Policy and Financial Secrecy
Jurisdictions, 18 INTERAMERICAN L. REv. 33, 50 (1986); see also Zagaris & Rosenthal, Securing
Documents Overseas by the United States, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 373
(M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1986).
100. See, e.g., Geiger, Legal Assistance Between States in Criminal Matters, 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 248, 249 (1986); Knecht, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Federal
Money Laundering Offense, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 389, 415-19 (1986). For an overview of the British
position, see Havers, Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: A Discussion of Problems Concerning the
Exercise of Jurisdiction, 17 INT'L LAW. 784 (1983).
101. Nadelmann, Negotiations in Criminal Law Assistance Treaties, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 467, 499
(1985).
102. R. BLUM, OFFSHORE HAVEN BANKS, TRUSTS, AND COMPANIES: THE BUSINESS OF CRIME IN THE
EUROMARKET 62 (1984).
103. See, e.g., Smith, Bank Secrecy in the Cayman Islands, 10 W. INDIAN L.J. 114 (1986).
104. See Horowitz, Piercing Offshore Bank Secrecy Laws Used to Launder Illegal Narcotics
Profits: The Cayman Islands Example, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 133, 138 (1985).
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factors,'0 5 the Cayman Islands had become "the quintessential secrecy haven in
this hemisphere." 1
0 6
In the course of time both the American government and U.S. prosecutors
became convinced that this British dependency was being extensively used both
for the evasion of U.S. revenue laws and for the "laundering" 0 7 of illicit profits
derived from narcotics trafficking and other criminal activities. 10 8 In these
circumstances clashes between the needs of U.S. prosecutors and the require-
ments of Caymanian secrecy legislation were, perhaps, inevitable. 109
Despite efforts to address the issue of the need for enhanced cooperation
through diplomatic channels," 0 and the occasional use of noncontroversial
methods to obtain confidential information located in the Cayman Islands,"'
matters came to a head in 1983. The specific cause of tension between the two
States arose when the Miami branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia was fined
105. In 1984 the U.S. Department of the Treasury stated: "There is no single, clear, objective test
which permits the identification of a country as a tax haven. There are, however, a number of factors
which are generally accepted as characteristic of tax havens. These include: relatively low rates of
tax; bank or commercial secrecy laws or administrative practices which the country is generally
unwilling to breach; a banking and financial sector which is large in relation to general levels of
domestic economic activity; the availability of modem communications facilities; the absence of
currency controls on foreign deposits of foreign currencies; and self promotion as an offshore
financial center." DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAX HAVENS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN 2 (1984).
For a recent review of U.S. law and practice in respect of such entities, see Caccamise, U.S.
Countermeasures Against Tax Haven Countries, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 553 (1988).
106. Horowitz, supra note 104, at 136. In March 1989 the U.S. Department of State noted that
"The Cayman Islands has become the largest offshore banking center in the Caribbean." BUREAU OF
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
STRATEGY REPORT 41 (1989) [hereinafter INCSR].
107. A 1987 Staff Report prepared for the use of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
Control stated: "Money laundering is the process of changing money gained from illegal operations
into a manageable form while concealing its illicit origins. Narcotics trafficking creates the largest
demand for money laundering, but organized crime activities such as gambling and loan sharking also
create a demand." LEGISLATION AIMED AT COMBATING INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING AND MONEY
LAUNDERING, S. PRINT No. 67, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. 13 (1987), [hereinafter S. PRINT No. 67].
108. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 105, at 34, 40; see also S. PRINT No. 67,
supra note 107, at 15; Grilli, Preventing Billions from being Washed Offshore: A Growing Approach
to Stopping International Drug Trafficking, 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 65, 67 (1987).
109. The initial clash arose out of a tax evasion investigation and resulted in the celebrated case
of United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976). See Westreich, Federal Judicial Compulsion
of an Alien's Testimony Contrary to the Mandate of the Laws of His Native Land, 16 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 356 (1977); see also Horowitz, supra note 104, at 150-52. For a subsequent
discussion of this case, see, e.g., United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1389-91
(llth Cir. 1982).
110. As with the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement of 1982. For the substance of this exchange,
see United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 823-25 (11 th Cir. 1984). The U.S. Court
of Appeals characterized the 1982 Agreement as "not a binding, enforceable agreement but rather as
an experimental and tentative alternative for the production of documents." Id. at 829-30.
111. As with the use of letters rogatory. For a discussion of the use of this procedure in the context
of U.S.-Cayman Islands relations, see Horowitz, supra note 104, at 152-56. See generally Paikin,
Problems of Obtaining Evidence in Foreign States for Use in Federal Criminal Prosecutions,
22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 233, 253-57 (1984).
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$1,825,000 for a civil contempt of court that resulted, in part,"1 2 from its failure
to produce documents held by its branch in the Cayman Islands even though
compliance with the grand jury subpoena, issued in the course of a narcotics
investigation, would have constituted a violation of the secrecy laws of that
jurisdiction. 113
The Bank of Nova Scotia case colored relations between the two States and,
in the words of the English Attorney General, Sir Michael Havers, "prompted
the U.K. and U.S. governments in the context of the extraterritoriality talks: then
being held to agree to talks to try and reach a settlement acceptable to all parties
involved for dealing with narcotics cases in future." 114 The outcome was. the
Exchange of Letters of July 26, 1984, between the United States and. the United
Kingdom "concerning the Cayman Islands and Matters connected with, arising
from, related to, or resulting from any Narcotics Activity referred to in the- Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the Protocol amending the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961."'15 The Agreement entered into
force in the following month after the Cayman Islands legislature enacted the
Narcotic Drugs (Evidence) (United States of America) Law, which was needed
in order to give domestic legal effect to its terms. 116
This Agreement, which is nonreciprocal in nature, establishes a simple and
straightforward procedure whereby the United States can obtain assistance in
investigations and prosecutions involving drug trafficking. 117 Provision is made,
upon receipt of a certificate from the U.S. Attorney General,'' 8 for the
"production of documents and records, together with provision of foundation
testimony, authentication, and certification necessary for these documents and
records to be admissible in court in the United States."" 9 In exchange for these
concessions the American government agreed to limit the use of unilateral
112. As the U.S. Court of Appeals stated in Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d at 821 n.5: "[O]f the
$1,825,000 fine imposed by the district court, only $100,000 is attributable to the- failure to produce
records from both the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. The remainder of the fine is imposed solely
because of the failure to produce the Bahamian records .. "
113. This case, frequently cited as Bank of Nova Scotia H, has been much discussed in the
scholarly literature. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 104, at 158-61; Weiland, Congress and the
Transnational Crime Problem, 20 INT'L LAW. 1025, 1026-27 (1986); Zagaris & Rosenthal, supra
note 99, at 382-83.
114. Havers, Legal Cooperation: A Matter of Necessity, 21 INT'L LAW. 1185, 190 (1987); also
reproduced in United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1986 (G. Marston ed.), in BRIT. Y.B.
Irr'L L. 574 (1986). See also Nadelmann, supra note 99, at 54-56. For one characterization of the
British view prior to these events, see Blum, supra note 102, at 226-32.
115. CMND. No. 9344 (1984).
116. Law 17 of 1984 (Cayman Islands).
117. See supra note 115, art. 2.
118. See id. art. 3. Upon receipt of such a certificate the Cayman Islands Attorney General lacks
discretion to refuse. See id. art. 3(2)(a); see also Law 17, supra note 116, § 4.
119. See Joint Responses of Department of Justice and Department of State to Questions Asked by
Senator Kerry, S. EXEC. REP. No. 8, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 101, 126 (1989) [hereinafter Joint
Responses]; see also Horowitz, supra note 104, at 161-64; Nadelmann, supra-note 99, at 56.
SUMMER 1990
382 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
measures in narcotics cases. Article 6 provides "No Federal subpoena (including
a Grand Jury subpoena) relating to documentary information located in Cayman
in any matter falling within . . . this Agreement will be enforced in the United
States without the prior agreement of either the United Kingdom Government or
the Cayman Government." Although this provision dealt with the specific source
of friction at issue in the Bank of Nova Scotia case, it was not a complete solution
to the judicial extraterritoriality controversy in that it did not seek to "prevent the
Americans from obtaining subpoenas in non-narcotics cases."
'1 20
Since its adoption, the Agreement has been extensively used and of practical
utility in law enforcement. As early as June 30, 1986, the English Attorney
General, in the course of a speech to the American Bar Association, reported that
the evidence produced as a result of the Agreement "has been instrumental in
furthering federal investigation into several hundred million dollars of drugs
trafficking. Several notorious drugs offenders have been put behind bars as a
result." 1 2 1 Similarly, the evidence suggests that "[p]rosecutors and agents con-
cerned with drug cases ...have been largely satisfied with the agreement's
limited but effective reach." 122 Indeed, the respective governments have been so
pleased with the experiment that they have since concluded similar agreements in
respect of all of the remaining Caribbean dependencies of the United Kingdom. 123
The process of British-American cooperation in criminal matters in a Carib-
bean context did not, and was not intended to, end with the 1984 Exchange of
Notes. 124 Indeed, the text of the Agreement expressly directed the parties to take
active steps to consider a treaty of wider scope concerning the Cayman Islands.
Article 7(3) reads:
120. Nadelmann, supra note 99, at 56 n.64.
121. Havers, supra note 114, at 190-91. As of August 1988 the United States had issued some
fifty-seven certificates pursuant to the Agreement, noninclusive of supplementary requests. See
Banking Close-Up, Newstar (Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands) 10, 12 (Aug. 1988).
122. Nadelmann, supra note 101, at 501. In 1989 U.S. Attorney General Thornburgh informed
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that existing MLATs "and related Executive Agreements,
particularly the ones with the Cayman Islands, have been very successful." S. EXEC. REP. No. 15,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1989).
123. For the September 18, 1986, Exchange of Letters in respect of the Turks and Caicos Islands,
see CM. No. 136 (1987). This was given legal effect within the territory by virtue of the terms of the
Narcotic Drugs (Evidence) (United States of America) Ordinance, 1986; Ordinance No. I of 1986
(Turks and Caicos Islands). As of October 1988 only one certificate had been issued pursuant to this
Agreement. See, e.g., Narcotics Issues in the Bahamas and the Caribbean: Hearing Before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1987). For the
Exchanges of Letters in respect of Montserrat, the British Virgin Islands and Anguilla, see CM.
No. 426 (1988), CM. No. 216 (1987), and CM. No. 169 (1987), respectively. See also Nadelmann,
supra note 99, at 58-59. There is no similar agreement with respect to Bermuda. For a description
of the attitude of the Bermuda government in this area, see Froomking, Money Laundering-An
International Perspective, in MEETING OF LAW OFFICERS OF SMALL COMMONWEALTH JURISDICTIONS:
5-9 DECEMBER 1988, HAMILTON, BERMUDA 144, 149-50 (Commonwealth Secretariat, London,
1989).
124. For example, in 1987 two agreements between the United Kingdom and the United States
were signed. One provided for the United States:
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The Governments of the United States and United Kingdom, including Cayman, will
use their best endeavors to conclude a Law Enforcement Treaty within fifteen months
of the date this Agreement comes into operation with the intention to bring such a treaty
into force as soon thereafter as their constitutional procedures will allow.
In order to give effect to this undertaking, the parties involved initiated
negotiations in November 1985. "The meetings between the Governments of
the United Kingdom, the United States and Cayman were preceded by
discussions in London between the Cayman Islands and the United Kingdom to
agree strategy for the negotiations." 125 These essentially tripartite discussions,
later described by the Attorney General of the Cayman Islands as "long and
arduous," 126 were successfully concluded in the following year. The product of
these efforts was the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Cayman
Islands Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters reached on
July 3, 1986.127
Although, subject to what is said below, the Cayman Islands' Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty (MLAT) is broadly similar in nature to earlier such treaties
entered into by the United States,1 28 the MLAT "represents a major break-
through in United States efforts to enlist the cooperation 6f Caribbean 'bank
secrecy' jurisdictions in the investigation and prosecution of transborder
to deliver an aircraft to the Government of the Turks and Caicos Islands to be used in
the fight against drug traffickers. The aircraft ... will also be used by the Government
of the British Virgin Islands ...A second Agreement has been signed to install an
anti-drugs radar tracking station on the island of Providenciales in the Turks and
Caicos Islands, thus extending U.S. surveillance of the area to cover both the
Bahamas and TCI.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Release (July 31, 1987). Neither agreement has thus far
been published in the United Kingdom. See also 145 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) No. 33, col. 791
(Jan. 27, 1989) (Written Answers). In 1988 the United States transferred a patrol-type vessel to the
Cayman Islands and another to Anguilla pursuant to agreements, in the form of Memoranda of
Understanding, with the United Kingdom. See INCSR, supra note 106, at 51. Other negotiations
including the possible extension of the Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos (OPBAT)
arrangements with the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the Turks and Caicos Islands, are taking
place at the time of writing. See, e.g., id. at 123. The United Kingdom and the United States also
participated in certain Caribbean regional initiatives. Thus, both accepted invitations to attend the
Caribbean Ministerial Drugs Conference in Jamaica in October 1989. See Foreign and Common-
wealth Office, Press Release No. 134 (Sept. 26, 1989).
125. Cayman Islands Government Information, Press Release (May 8, 1986).
126. Statement of Michael Bradley, Attorney General, during the Second Reading of the Mutual
Legal Assistance (United States of America) Bill, Sept. 1986 (transcript provided by the Attorney
General, Grand Cayman) [hereinafter Bradley].
127. CMND. No. 9862 (1986).
128. See, e.g., Report on Cayman Islands Treaty. 21 INT'L LAW. 1240, 1241 (1987); see also
Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 103, 112-18 (1988) (Judicial Assistance-U.S.-U.K. Treaties Concerning the Cayman
Islands). On the evolving United States practice in this area, see, e.g., Ellis & Pisani, The United
States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters: A Comparative Analysis, 19 INT'L LAW.
189 (1985).
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crime." 129 For the United Kingdom the Treaty, though confined geographically
to a dependency, also sets a potentially important precedent in that it is the first,
and thus far the only, instance of British participation in either bilateral or
multilateral full scale MLATs in the criminal law sphere. 130
The Treaty, which unlike the 1984 Agreement is fully reciprocal in nature,
makes provision for a wide variety of differing forms of assistance, which
include:
(a) taking the testimony or statements of persons;
(b) providing documents, records and articles of evidence;
(c) serving documents;
(d) locating persons;
(e) transferring persons in custody for testimony;
(f) executing requests for searches and seizures;
(g) immobilizing criminally obtained assets;
(h) assistance in proceedings relating to forfeiture, restitution and collection
of fines; and
(i) any other steps deemed appropriate by both Central Authorities.131
Such procedures are available "for the investigation, prosecution and suppres-
sion of criminal offenses," as well as "civil and administrative proceedings"
arising out of, relating to, or resulting from narcotics trafficking. 132 It should be
noted that the term "narcotics trafficking" is defined in article 19(3)(e) in a
manner broader than that contained in the 1984 Exchange of Notes. The
definition in the 1986 Treaty encompasses not only activities covered by the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, but also "any other international
agreements or arrangements binding upon both the Parties." As the Technical
Analysis prepared by the U.S. Departments of Justice and State opines:
This is significant because the United Kingdom has now, like the United States, become
a party to the Convention on Psychotropic Substances ... Other international
agreements may come into force in the future, and the scope of offenses covered by the
treaty has the flexibility to grow as the international regulation of illegal narcotics
trafficking grows. 133
129. Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State Schultz to President Reagan on July 23, 1987, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 8, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Letter of Submittal].
130. See INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS-A DISCUSSION PAPER
(Home Office, London, 1988) [hereinafter DISCUSSION PAPER].
131. See CMND. No. 9862, supra note 127, art. 1(2). Requests are to be made through the
Central Authority of each party. Id. art. 2. The Cayman Mutual Legal Assistance Authority "shall
be the Chief Justice, who shall exercise his functions under the Treaty and this Law acting alone and
in an administrative capacity, or another Judge of the Grand Court designated by the Chief Justice
to act on his behalf." Mutual Legal Assistance (United States of America) Law, 1986; Law 16 of
1986, s.4 (Cayman Islands). For the reasons behind this somewhat unusual decision, see Bradley,
supra note 126.
132. CMND. No. 9862, supra note 127, art. 1(1).
133. Technical Analysis of the Treaty Between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in
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In the course of the negotiations the parties concluded that the Treaty would
not cover all criminal activity. The interaction of article 3(1) and article 19 results,
in the words of the Attorney General of the Cayman Islands, in the fact that the
Treaty "does not extend to tax matters and it does not extend to trivial criminal
offenses." 13 4 The British and Caymanian negotiators deemed the restriction on
tax matters necessary to safeguard the viability of the latter's offshore financial
business so critical to the local economy. 135 The protection afforded in this regard
is not, however, absolute in nature. As has been pointed out elsewhere, "the treaty
does authorize assistance in prosecuting two types of tax-related crime: fraud
connected with income tax shelters and false statements on tax returns with respect
to unlawful proceeds of other crimes covered by the treaty." 136 Finally, assistance
is permitted in narcotics related tax matters. In the words of the Technical
Analysis, "a civil or administrative tax proceeding involving the assets acquired
through illegal drug trafficking could qualify as an offense under article 19(3)(c)
for which assistance could be provided under the treaty."
137
The restriction of the Treaty to what might be termed serious criminal offenses
is attained through the inclusion of a general rule limiting its scope to "[a]ny
conduct punishable by more than one year's imprisonment under the laws of both
the Requesting and Requested Parties."' 38 The Treaty, however, specifies
exceptions to the strict requirements of double criminality that include, in
addition to narcotics trafficking, such offenses as "racketeering" and "foreign
corrupt practices." 139 A further element of flexibility has been provided by
article 19(3)(k), which states that the term "criminal offense" shall also include:
"Such further offenses as may from time to time be agreed upon by exchange of
diplomatic notes between the United States and the United Kingdom, including
the Cayman Islands."
The prospect for using this provision to add to the list of criminal offenses in a
manner contrary to the perceived interests of the Cayman Islands should not, however,
be overstated. 140 As the Attorney General informed the Cayman Islands Legislature:
We, the Government of the Cayman Islands, have a specific, categorical undertaking
from our Sovereign Mother, the United Kingdom, that there will be no further offense
added to this list, even though the United Kingdom and the United States both agree,
without the specific consent, Sir, of the Government of the Cayman Islands. We have
the say so. They cannot do it without us. 141
Criminal Matters, S. EXEC. REP. No. 8, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 48 n.40 (1989) [hereinafter
Technical Analysis].
134. Bradley, supra note 126.
135. See Technical Analysis, supra note 133, at 14.
136. Report on Cayman Islands Treaty at 1243.
137. Technical Analysis, supra note 133, at 14.
138. CMND. No. 9862, supra note 127, art. 19(3)(a); see also id. art. 3(l)(b).
139. See id. art. 19(3).
140. See, e.g., Grilli, supra note 108, at 87.
141. Bradley, supra note 126.
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The Cayman Islands Treaty, like other MLATs concluded by the United States,
contains a number of specified limitations on assistance. Thus assistance may be
denied if the request is not made in conformity with the Treaty,' 4 2 if it "relates
to a political offense or to an offense under military law which would not be an
offense under ordinary criminal law," 143 or where the requested party, through its
Attorney General, certifies "that the execution of the request is contrary to the
public interest of the Requested Party." 144 In addition, however, and for the first
time in U.S. practice in this area, the Treaty permits assistance to be denied where:
"the request does not establish that there are reasonable grounds for believing:
(i) that the criminal offence specified in the request has been committed; and (ii)
that the information sought relates to the offence and is located in the territory of
the Requested Party."'' 45 This innovation was included in the text because the
British and Caymanian negotiators wanted to ensure that the MLAT was not used
as a mechanism for indulging in mere "fishing expeditions." 1
46
Whether this provision will cause difficulties in practice is hard to predict,
though it is apparent that problems may arise out of differing conceptions as to
the exact burden of proof to be discharged by the requesting party. Thus,
according to the U.S. Technical Analysis:
The phrase "reasonable grounds to believe" is not the equivalent of a primafacie case
• . . Rather the phrase was intended to require each Party to support its request with a
precise, rational explanation for its belief that a crime covered by the Treaty has occurred
or will occur, and to set forth in detail the justification for seeking the evidence. 147
By way of contrast, the Attorney General of the Cayman Islands has informed
the territory's Legislature that the same phrase "basically is saying that there
must be established, to use lawyers' terms, a good prima facie case. ' 4 The
potential for friction between the parties is self-evident; however,
[t]he negotiators realized that occasionally there will be differences of opinion which
the law enforcement authorities who implement the treaty will be unable to resolve
despite the best of intentions. The second paragraph of Article 18 specifically
recognizes that in such cases either side may seek the assistance of the diplomatic and
political authorities to resolve the difficulty. 149
142. CMND. No. 9862, supra note 127, art. 3(2)(a).
143. Id. art. 3(2)(b). The U.S. Technical Analysis records the view that "we would not expect the
Central Authority of either party to deny a request as a 'political offense' if it involves the kind of
conduct listed in the Supplementary Treaty to the Extradition Treaty between the United States and
the United Kingdom .... Technical Analysis, supra note 133, at 14-15 n.8; see also Joint
Responses, supra note 119, at 142 (testimony).
144. CMND. No. 9862, supra note 127, art. 3(3). For the view of the United States on this
provision, see Technical Analysis, supra note 133, at 15-16. For the views of the Caymanian
authorities, see Bradley, supra note 126.
145. CMND. No. 9862, supra note 127, art. 3(2)(c).
146. See Joint Responses, supra note 119, at 122-23 (testimony).
147. Technical Analysis, supra note 133, at 15.
148. Bradley, supra note 126.
149. Technical Analysis, supra note 133, at 47.
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One area in which the potential for friction has been reduced, but not
eliminated, by the Treaty is that of judicial extraterritoriality. As has been
pointed out:
[S]ome methods of evidence gathering permitted under United States internal law have
the practical result of evidence being collected in the Cayman Islands and being turned
over to United States authorities without the permission of the Cayman Islands
authorities, and are hence viewed by the Cayman Islands and the United Kingdom as
impermissible intrusions into their sovereignty. They insisted that the mutual legal
assistance treaty contain at least the same kind of restriction on United States
extraterritorial evidence gathering that the Drug Information Agreement contains. 150
Such concerns are addressed in article 17, section 3, which is of central
importance:
No Party shall enforce any compulsory measure, including a grand jury subpoena, for
the production of documents located in the territory of the other Party with respect to
any criminal offence within the scope of this Treaty, unless its obligations under the
Treaty have first been fulfilled pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article with respect to a
request concerning those documents.
This provision covers not only grand jury subpoenas but also other compulsory
measures for the production of documents. The parties agreed that this wording
encompasses trial subpoenas and "court orders to a person commanding that he sign
a waiver of foreign bank secrecy or direct his bank abroad to turn over records to
United States authorities... . Thus, this paragraph of the treaty is somewhat
broader in scope than the cognate provision of the Drug Information Agreement." 151
Although this extended coverage constitutes an improvement from the point of view
of both the British and Caymanian governments, other unilateral practices regarded
as either undesirable or objectionable are not covered. As U.S. Secretary of State
Schultz noted in his July 23, 1987, Letter of Submittal to the President:
The article does not, however, cover administrative summonses of agencies such as the
Internal Revenue Service or the Securities and Exchange Commission, so long as the
matter being investigated does not constitute a criminal offense under the treaty. Neither
does it preclude issuance of a subpoena or material witness warrant for any persons
temporarily in the United States, even though the disclosure of information protected by
Caymanian secrecy laws may be required. 152
The above should be read in conjunction with article 17(4), which outlines the
procedure to follow if a party wishes to free itself from the specified restrictions:
Where denial of a request or unreasonable delay in its execution may be jeopardizing
the successful completion of an investigation, prosecution or other proceeding, the
150. Id. at 44; see also id. at 220-21 (statement of Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, Department
of State).
151. Id. at 45. The Caymanian courts have declined to accept compelled consents of this kind. See
In re ABC Ltd., 1984 C.1.L.R. 130; Attorney General v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 1985 C.I.L.R. 418.
On June 22, 1988, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this procedure in
a case concerning, in part, the Cayman Islands. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
152. Letter of Submittal, supra note 129, at xi.
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Central Authority of the Requesting Party shall so inform the Central Authority of the
Requested Party in writing. Thereafter, either Contracting Party may give at least 45
days' notice in writing to the other Contracting Party that, unless otherwise agreed, the
Parties' obligations under this Article shall be deemed to have been fulfilled; provided
that in no case shall the obligations under this Article be deemed to have been fulfilled
sooner than 90 days after the date of receipt of the request for assistance.
As was pointed out in the Technical Analysis:
[T]he basic thrust of the paragraph is to insure that when the United States seeks records
which are in the Cayman Islands in a case covered by the treaty, it will use the treaty
as the avenue of first resort, and will not utilize unilateral compulsory measures unless
it has first notified the Caymanian authorities of the problem, sought their aid in the
production of the records pursuant to Cayman law, accorded them a reasonable period
of time for their response, then waited a further period to permit such diplomatic
consultations as the parties deem appropriate. 153
Given the potential for conflict in this area, article 17 was the subject of a side
letter dated July 3, 1986, between the American Embassy in London and the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which spelled out a number of nonbinding
understandings. 154 Among other things, the correspondence records that "[e] ven
in those cases in which the Parties' obligations under Article 17 have been
fulfilled with respect to a particular request, each Party shall continue to exercise
moderation and restraint in considering the enforcement of unilateral measures to
which the other objects for the production or withholding of evidence." 155
Although the conclusion of the MLAT was a highly controversial issue in the
domestic politics of the Cayman Islands,' 56 its legislature acted promptly to
enact the necessary implementing legislation. 157 In spite of this fact the Treaty,
the terms of which can be extended by Exchange of Notes to the other British
dependencies in the Caribbean region,' 58 did not receive the requisite assent by
the U.S. Senate to its ratification until October 24, 1989, a situation which
caused some dismay both in Cayman and in the United Kingdom.' 
59
B. OTHER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS
Much though the above treaty practice broke new ground for the United
Kingdom, one should not lose sight of the fact that it was generated by, and in
the main limited to, the actual and alleged misuse of the otherwise relatively
insignificant Caribbean dependencies of the Crown for criminal purposes. The
opportunity to involve the United Kingdom directly and centrally was not,
153. Technical Analysis, supra note 133, at 46.
154. Reproduced in 26 I.L.M. 550 (1987).
155. Id. at 551.
156. See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 99, at 57.
157. See supra note 131.
158. See CMND. No. 9862, supra note 127 (Protocol).
159. It is understood that the problem was not with the Cayman Islands Treaty as such, but with
two of the other five MLATs then before the Senate in the ratification "package": Mexico and the
Bahamas. See, e.g., TECHNICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 133, at 6.
VOL. 24, NO. 2
U.K. ACTION AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING 389
however, to be for long neglected, and again the subject of international action
against drug trafficking was the catalyst.
In the mid-1980s the British government concluded that new legislative
powers were needed to deprive narcotics traffickers of the proceeds of their
criminal activities. In this they had the full support of the influential House of
Commons Home Affairs Committee. In its May 1985 interim report on the
"Misuse of Hard Drugs" the Committee stated:
The American practice, which we unhesitatingly support, is to give the courts
draconian powers in both civil and criminal law to strip drug dealers of all the assets
acquired from their dealings in drugs . . .We recommend that the civil and criminal law
of the United Kingdom be amended to provide for the seizure and forfeiture of assets
connected with drug traffic in accordance with the American practice. 160
This recommendation was, save in respect of civil forfeiture, generally
accepted by the British government and was given legislative expression for
England and Wales in the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986.16' As has been
officially stated: "The Act provides comprehensive new powers for tracing,
freezing and confiscating the proceeds of drug trafficking, and measures to
combat the laundering of illegal drugs money." 162 Similar powers were assumed
in respect of Scotland by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 1987163 while
legislation along these lines for Northern Ireland "is expected to be introduced
in the near future. ' t 64 In addition to thus covering the United Kingdom proper
"[l]egislation similar to the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act 1986 has been
enacted in the Isle of Man, Jersey, Guernsey and several dependent territories,
and the necessary steps are being taken to enable the United Kingdom and all
these territories to act on behalf of one another." 165
160. Misuse of Hard Drugs, supra note 3, para. 9.
161. 1986 ch. 32 (U.K.). For an account of the disinclination of the British government to follow
the U.S. example in respect of civil forfeiture, see M. ZANDER, CONFISCATION AND FORFEITURE LAW:
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN COMPARISONS 44-45 (1989).
162. TACKLING DRUG MISUSE, supra note 1, at 20. On December 12, 1989, the Minister of State,
Home Office, informed the House of Lords that: "Confiscation orders have been made totalling more
than £13 million, and more than £22 million has been restrained." PARL. DEB., H.L., Vol. 513, No.
13, col. 1230 [hereinafter Parliamentary Statement]. Since that time a number of significant
confiscation orders have been reported in the press. See, e.g., Mastermind of Drugs Plot Jailed for
Fifteen Years, The Independent (London), Dec. 22, 1989; Bags of Cash Deposited in London Bank,
The Independent (London), Dec. 16, 1989. In 1988 the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA)
extended the attack on assets to those derived from other serious crimes. See generally D. FELDMAN,
CRIMINAL CONFISCATION ORDERS: THE NEW LAW (1988). In 1989 a further initiative was adopted in
respect of the assets of terrorists. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989,
ch. 4 (U.K.).
163. 1987 ch. 41 (U.K.). The subject of enacting legislation similar to the CJA is currently under
review in Scotland. See SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, FORFEITURE AND CONFISCATION (DISCUSSION
PAPER No. 82) (H.M.S.O., Edinburgh, 1989).
164. Inquiry, supra note 4, at 1I.
165. Id. at 13. For the current position in the Cayman Islands, see Misuse of Drugs (Amendment)
Law, 1988; Law 8 of 1988 (Cayman Islands); and Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Law, 1989. Law 3
of 1989 (Cayman Islands). See also CMND. No. 9862, supra note 127, art. 16. For the position in
the Turks and Caicos Islands, see Control of Drugs (Trafficking) Ordinance 1988. Ordinance No. 13
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It should be stressed that the above legislation is not limited to facilitating
cooperation between the various jurisdictions with the United Kingdom and with
the remaining dependencies. Provision is also made for the enforcement:
of orders made by courts in designated countries for the recovery of the proceeds of
drug trafficking. This will provide the basis for reciprocal agreements with other
countries, with a view to the enforcement overseas of orders made by our courts against
assets held by convicted traffickers and vice versa. 166
It is perhaps fitting that the first bilateral agreement to make use of these
powers was concluded with the United States on February 9, 1988.167 As Sir
Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, stated at the signing ceremony in
London: "It will strengthen the already close cooperation between our enforce-
ment agencies. It will enable us jointly to trace, freeze and confiscate the assets
of drug traffickers. The vicious circle of profiteering from the drug trade will be
broken."'' 68 Since that time Britain has concluded similar agreements with
Canada, Australia, the Bahamas, Switzerland, Spain, Nigeria, Malaysia, and
Sweden 169 and others are in prospect. 170
of 1988 (Turks and Caicos Islands). For an enactment outside of the Caribbean of great potential
significance, see Drug Trafficking (Recovery of Proceeds) Ordinance, 1989; Ordinance No. 35/89
(Hong Kong). It is understood that final designation arrangements have been concluded with
Anguilla, Bermuda, and Gibraltar thus far.
166. TACKLING DRUG MISUSE, supra note 1, at 20. For an overview of the growing global practice
in this regard, see, e.g., McClean, Seizing the Proceeds of Crime: The State of the Art, 38 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 334 (1989).
167. AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE INVESTIGATION OF DRUG TRAFFICKING OFFENSES AND THE SEIZURE
AND FORFEITURE OF THE PROCEEDS AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF DRUG TRAFFICKING, CM. No. 755 (1989).
168. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Press Release (Feb. 9, 1988) [hereinafter Press
Release]. Article I(2)(a) of the Agreement reads: "This Agreement shall apply: (a) in relation to the
United Kingdom: to England and Wales, and subject to any necessary modifications, by agreement
between the Parties embodied in an exchange of Notes, to Scotland and Northern Ireland and to any
territories for the international relations of which the United Kingdom is responsible." The necessary
domestic law designation in relation to England and Wales was provided by The Drug Trafficking
Offenses Act 1986, (United States of America) Order 1989. S. 1. 1989 No. 485. See also SECOND
STANDING COMMITTEE ON STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 7, 1989).
Pursuant to article 14 of the Agreement it was brought into force on Apr. 11, 1989. See DEP'T ST.
BULL. 70 (June 1989). Press reports indicate that this Agreement was used by the United States in
December 1989, following its military incursion in Panama, to freeze the U.K.-based assets of
General Noriega. See Noriega Sits Tight ..... The Independent (London), Dec. 29, 1989. Similar
cooperation has been requested from other European governments. See e.g., Nunciature Nine
Surrender, The Independent (London), Dec. 28, 1989.
169. See May 1989 Remarks, supra note 1, at 8. For the text of the Agreement with the Bahamas,
see CM. No. 475 (1988). The Agreement with Nigeria is understood to break new ground in that it
extends to the confiscation of the proceeds of crime generally and is not restricted to drug trafficking
offenses. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Conference (Sept. 18, 1989) (unpublished:
text provided by Foreign and Commonwealth Office). The most recent agreement, that with Sweden,
also covers all serious crime. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Press Release No. 175
(Dec. 14, 1988).
170. See id; see also Parliamentary Statement, supra note 162, col. 524; and the May 10, 1989
evidence of Mr. J. Potts of the Home Office, H.C. Paper No. 370-i, at 14 (1988-89). Other
arrangements, such as the United Kingdom/Brazil Drugs Agreement, 1988, are somewhat less
ambitious. It provides, in relevant part, as follows:
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As with the Cayman Islands where a narcotics agreement led to the conclusion
of a full mutual legal assistance treaty, so the February 1988 Agreement with the
United States commits the parties to enter into negotiations for a full MLAT
within nine months of its entry into force. 17 1 As was noted above, the United
Kingdom has not thus far directly joined in the growing practice of cooperation
offered by this international mechanism; however, in February 1988 an interde-
partmental working group issued a discussion paper in which it "concluded that
there are strong arguments in favor of reform of United Kingdom mutual
assistance law with a view to participation in formal mutual assistance
arrangements." 172 In late 1989 the government introduced, in the House of
Lords, the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Bill, which is designed
to give effect to this intention. 173 Part I of the Bill provides the necessary power
to give domestic effect to any arrangement eventually concluded with the United
States and facilitates British participation in the 1959 European Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters' 74 and the 1986 Commonwealth
Scheme.1 75 In particular, the Bill makes provision, among other things, for: the
service of process; the provision of evidence; the transfer of prisoners to give
evidence or assist in investigations overseas; powers of entry, search, and seizure
in furtherance of overseas proceedings; and, the enforcement of certain overseas
forfeiture orders. As the Minister of State for the Home Office, Earl Ferrers, was
to state during the Second Reading of this measure: "Having recognized the
inadequacies of our existing legislation, we have been determined to secure
arrangements which will place us in the first rank internationally in our ability to
co-operate with other countries in this most important of areas." 176
1. The two Governments, subject to the laws and regulations in force in their
respective countries, propose to promote mutual co-operation to prevent the illicit
production of, traffic in, and improper use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances, in accordance with the present Agreement, in the following fields: ... (d)
exchange of information about the confiscation of goods obtained illicitly through
traffic in drugs, as well as the examination of future complementary arrangements for
reciprocal assistance in this field.
CM. No. 769 (1989). The above initiatives are fully in accord with the Paris Economic Declaration
of July 1989, supra note 22, at 17, where the participants, including the United Kingdom, resolved
to "conclude further bilateral or multilateral agreements and support initiatives and cooperation,
where appropriate, which include measures to facilitate the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure
and forfeiture of drug crime proceeds."
171. See supra note 167, art. 13. It is understood that such negotiations are now under way.
172. DISCUSSION PAPERS, supra note 130, at 6.
173. Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Bill. H.L. Bill 11, 1989-90.
174. July 30, 1963, 472 U.N.T.S. 185.
175. For the text of the Commonwealth Scheme and an explanatory commentary thereon, see,
e.g., 4 SCHEME RELATING TO MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS WITHIN THE COMMON-
WEALTH 1-51 (Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1989). See also McClean, Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters: The Commonwealth Initiative, 37 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 177 (1988). A further
impetus for mutual assistance is provided by the terms of article 7 of the 1988 U.N. Convention. See
supra note 21.
176. PARL. DEB., H.L., Vol. 513, No. 13, 12 December 1989, col. 1217.
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IV. Conclusion
In recent years, as has been demonstrated, the United Kingdom has taken
radical steps to enhance its ability to play a full and active role in the fight against
international crime. In part this has taken the form of liberalizing the law relating
to extradition, which will make it significantly easier for foreign States to secure
the return from the United Kingdom of fugitives from justice.
Perhaps more importantly for the future, concern about the global nature of the
drug trade has been instrumental in the taking of the first major steps to set aside
the traditional reluctance to aid other States in the execution of their penal laws.
The new underlying approach of the British government in respect of drug
trafficking was articulated in 1988 by the Foreign Secretary thus:
The costs of this vice are incalculable. The misery all too clear. This is why [Her
Majesty's Government] is taking a lead in fighting the menace of drug abuse. There is
no place in our societies for drug traffickers. Alone we are weak in fighting them, but
together we will win. '
The prospects for further developments in enhancing international law
enforcement along a broader front are also bright.1 78 In the near term emphasis
is to be placed on securing the enactment of legislation to enable the United
Kingdom to ratify the 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 179 This is seen by the British government as
a most important instrument "in the fight against the evil men who produce,
manufacture and distribute drugs, and who thereby corrupt society." 180
177. Press Release, supra note 168.
178. It should be noted that the nature and extent of U.K.-U.S. cooperation is kept under periodic
review, in part through the U.K./U.S. High Level Steering Group on Drugs Co-operation which met
for the first time in July 1987. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Press Release (July 23, 1987).
The two governments also cooperate in the provision of drugs related assistance to third countries.
See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Drug
Detector Dog Training for Third Countries (unpublished agreement signed in Washington D.C. on
Mar. 29, 1988; text provided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office). The value of the provision
of this service was specifically recorded in paragraph 25 of the "Drugs Law Enforcement Conference
Communique" following the conclusion of a twenty-five-country regional conference held in
Barbados on March 7-8, 1988 (unpublished text provided by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office). For one analysis of the legal status of such a memorandum of understanding, see Aust, The
Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments, 35 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 787 (1986).
Further cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States is facilitated by the presence
of drug law enforcement specialists within the jurisdiction of the other. Thus the British Drugs
Liaison Officer scheme extends to the United States. The United States "have DEA staff, Customs
staff and an FBI representative in London." Memorandum submitted by the National Drugs
Intelligence Unit to the Home Affairs Committee 12 July 1989, H.C. Paper No. 370-vii, at 117 para.
4-4 (1988-89).
179. See supra note 21.
180. Supra note 176, col. 1217.
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